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Tax Reform Unraveling
Michael J. Graetz
T he Tax Reform Act of 1986 was widely heralded as the most significantchange in our nation’s tax law since the income tax was extended to themasses during World War II. It was the crowning domestic policy achieve-
ment of President Ronald Reagan, who proclaimed it “the best antipoverty mea-
sure, the best pro-family measure and the best job-creation measure ever to come
out of the Congress of the United States” (Reagan, 1986). This journal published
a symposium on the Tax Reform Act in its first issue. The law’s rate reductions and
base broadening reforms were mimicked throughout the countries belonging to
the OECD (Sandford, 1993; Owens, 2005). Even at the time, however, reading the
paeans to this legislation was like watching a Tennessee Williams play: something
was terribly wrong, but nobody was talking about it. Two decades later, the changes
wrought by the 1986 act have proven neither revolutionary nor stable.
As a political matter, it was necessary for the 1986 Tax Reform Act to be
approximately revenue neutral and roughly distributionally neutral to achieve the
bipartisan majorities necessary for its enactment. Thus, the legislation can be
broadly viewed as a rearrangement of the tax code, in which marginal tax rates were
reduced and the tax base was broadened by limiting or eliminating various loop-
holes, deductions, and exemptions. The 1986 act did enhance both the equity and
efficiency of the income tax, but it was far from the purist cleansing of the tax code
that some of its more ardent admirers implied.
The 1986 act substantially increased the permissible amount of tax-free in-
come, removing about six million low-income people from the income tax rolls;
lowered and flattened income tax rates; shut down mass-marketed tax shelters for
high-income individuals and curtailed their ability to shift income to lower-income
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family members subject to lower marginal tax rates; and taxed capital gains at the
same rates as ordinary income (Musgrave, 1987). An increase in corporate tax
revenues was used to finance an overall reduction in individual tax revenues,
although the corporate marginal tax rate was also reduced (from 46 to 34 percent).
The increase in corporate tax revenues came largely from repealing tax benefits for
new investments in real estate and equipment. In combination, these changes
reduced the tax burden on service companies while increasing it for capital-
intensive industries, including manufacturing firms and real estate, a change which
made the income tax burden considerably more neutral across industries.
Tax reform that is both revenue and distributionally neutral is unlikely to have
massive effects on the economy. The Tax Reform Act neither spurred American
productivity, as some of its admirers hoped, nor destroyed it, as many of its
detractors had warned. Slemrod (1990) estimated that the 1986 act may have
spurred as much as a 1 percent increase in hours worked—a genuine benefit, but
hardly a new American revolution. In addition, the act ultimately fell short of
creating a substantially fairer income tax, because it left in place many avenues for
tax-favored treatment. Tax-exempt fringe benefits such as health insurance, pen-
sions, and others were hardly touched. Complex new rules limited personal interest
deductions to homeowners. Many provisions offering incentives for specific invest-
ments such as tax-deferred annuities and tax-exempt state and local bonds were
continued, and new ones were added. Families were permitted a tax reduction
when a child turned 14, no doubt to offset the additional burdens of having an
adolescent in the household. Hundreds of scatter-shot “transition” rules were
enacted to give special tax breaks to particular companies or individuals. For
instance, donors purchasing valuable football or basketball tickets from the
University of Texas or Louisiana State University were allowed to count a
substantial portion of the tickets’ total cost as a charitable deduction. This rule
was so envied by other football and basketball powerhouses that in 1988 Congress
extended the generosity to donors purchasing athletic tickets from other colleges
and universities.
Compromise is often the handmaiden of tax complexity, and the 1986 legis-
lation was forged out of hundreds of political compromises. Rather than eliminat-
ing provisions of dubious merit, Congress settled for reducing their benefits or
restricting their use. Examples abound: the new tax law contained rules distinguish-
ing at least 17 different categories of interest expenses; the 1986 rules for interna-
tional investments were stupefying in their complexity; and the alternative mini-
mum tax provisions (originally intended to makes sure that those with high
incomes all pay at least some minimum level of tax) required three different ways
of calculating income, each with its own rate schedule.
This 1986 tax reform legislation was an uneasy marriage of two contrary
ideological and political camps. Conventional Democratic tax reformers were
principally interested in improving tax equity by eliminating tax preferences and
treating all income alike regardless of its source. On the other side, Republican
supply-siders and deregulators were principally interested in lowering tax rates.
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Support for tax reform was bipartisan, but tepid. The 1986 act was enacted only
because of the determined, if somewhat surprising, efforts of Ronald Reagan, who
had once described the progressive income tax as having come “direct from Karl
Marx” (Reagan, 1961), and the leadership of Republican Senator Robert Pack-
wood, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Democrat Dan Rosten-
kowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.
The ink had hardly dried on the 1986 tax act before Democrats, most notably
Speaker of the House Jim Wright of Texas, called for rate increases, and supply-side
Republicans initiated tax incentives for savings and investments. In the two decades
since 1986, Congress has amended the tax law annually, adding thousands of pages
of new legislation to the Code. Six enactments were particularly important: 1) the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (the “1990 Budget Act”), a bipartisan
deficit-reduction measure that broke George H. W. Bush’s famous “no new taxes
pledge,” probably costing him reelection; 2) the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 (the “1993 Act”), Bill Clinton’s rate-raising deficit reduction effort,
which was enacted with only Democratic votes; 3) the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(the “1997 Act”), a bipartisan tax-cutting law, most notable for cutting capital gains
rates; 4) the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the
“2001 Act”), a tax reduction measure fulfilling George W. Bush’s campaign prom-
ises to cut income tax rates and eliminate the estate tax; 5) the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (the “2003 Act”), another George W. Bush tax
cutting measure, most notable for lowering taxes on dividends and capital gains;
6) the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “2004 Act”), a corporate tax cut,
responding in part to a decision of the World Trade Organization that had
declared income tax benefits for exports illegal. These laws unraveled the 1986
reform by narrowing the corporate and individual income tax bases and raising the
top individual income tax rate. The 1986 coalition of supply-side Republicans and
tax-reforming Democrats has disintegrated. Republicans typically now favor low
rates applied to a narrow base, while Democrats prefer higher rates on a different
but also narrow base.
In retrospect, the inherent weaknesses of the 1986 Tax Reform Act have
become easy to identify. First, the fragile political coalition that enacted the law left
in place a variety of ongoing complexities, inequities, and inefficiencies. Second,
the 1986 tax reform legislation had little public support even when it was passed.
On June 25, 1986, the day after the Senate passed tax reform by a 97–3 vote, the New
York Times reported that fewer than one-third of Americans believed that the Senate
bill would produce a fairer tax system or reduce their own taxes (Clymer, 1986).
Third, the revenue neutrality of the 1986 legislation failed to address the dominant
fiscal policy issue of the day—the size of the federal deficit—which assured that
many tax policy changes would soon become necessary. Fourth, the 1986 tax act was
based on retaining and strengthening the income tax, rather than heeding the calls
of many economists and politicians to replace it with some form of consumption
tax. The internationalization of economic activity during the last two decades has
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made the 1986 Act’s reliance on increased taxation of income from capital and
corporate income difficult to sustain.
Tax experts now regard the 1986 act as a promise failed. The public seems to
agree, and considerable public support exists for a “flat tax” or a national sales tax
to replace the income tax. Before turning to proposals for restructuring the
nation’s tax system, I shall examine the most important individual and corporate
income tax changes since 1986.
Changes in the Individual Income Tax
Despite all the changes to the tax code since 1986, the overall level of
individual income taxes as a percentage of GDP has remained fairly steady, rising
somewhat due to the tax increases and booming stock market of the late 1990s and
falling after 2001 due to George W. Bush’s tax cuts, as shown in Figure 1. However,
legislative and economic developments have wrought important changes in the
structure of the tax.
The EITC and Child Tax Credit
At the bottom of the income scale, the most important changes have involved
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and child credits. The EITC was originally
adopted in 1975. It provides a tax credit for low-income working parents. In 2003,
for example, for a family with two children, the tax credit is worth 40 percent of
income up to the first $10,510 earned, so that the maximum credit was $4,204.
Then the amount of the tax credit does not increase as the family’s income rises to
approximately $14,730, and the credit phases out as the family’s income rises to
roughly $34,692 (IRS, 2005; Parisi and Hollenbeck, 2005). Moreover, the tax credit
is “refundable,” which means that when the credit is more than the income taxes
that would have been owed—a common occurrence for a low-income family with
children—then the amount of the credit is paid to the taxpayer. The rate of the
credit and the income ranges at which it applies vary according to filing status and
the number of children. Also, taxpayers with investment income greater than a
specified amount are not eligible.
Back in 1975, 6.2 million taxpayers claimed $1.25 billion of earned income tax
credits (about $4.3 billion in 2003 dollars). Then, the maximum credit was $400
($1,350 in 2003 dollars), and the income level at which the EITC phased-out
completely was $8,000 (about $27,350 in 2003 dollars). The 1990 Budget Act
increased the credit somewhat, and the 1993 legislation substantially expanded it.
In effect, the EITC was transformed in the 1990s from a relatively small adjustment
in the progressivity of the tax system—intended mainly to offset Social Security
taxes on low income workers—into a partial replacement for welfare. In 1978, the
year Congress made the EITC permanent, about $1.1 billion was refunded to
working families, far less than the $6.3 billion in cash grants paid by the main
welfare program at that time, Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
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In 2003, nearly $39 billion in earned income tax credits were claimed by more than
22 million taxpayers. Of that amount only about $5 billion was used to offset taxes;
$34 billion was paid out directly as refunds. The $39 billion of EITC was about twice
the $19.6 billion spent that year on AFDC’s successor, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). The EITC amount was also more than the $35.1 billion
spent on Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the program for the low-income
elderly. In addition, welfare payments under TANF generally cannot be received
for more than five years, but the EITC can be claimed annually by low-income
workers without any time limit.
A second partially refundable credit, the Child Tax Credit, was enacted in
1997, providing a $400 credit per child (rising to $500 in 1999). The 2001 act
increased the credit to $1,000. (Like all of the 2001 tax act, the increase in the child
credit is scheduled to terminate after 2010, when the law will revert to its pre-2001
status in the unlikely event that there is no further congressional action.) In 2003,
child tax credits totaled nearly $32 billion, with more than $9 billion of that amount
refunded to taxpayers who otherwise owed no income tax.
The 1986 tax reform had reaffirmed the principle, first established in 1969,
that no income tax should be paid by people with incomes at or below the poverty
level. The 1986 Act accomplished this result by increases in personal exemptions
(an amount excluded from taxation for each person in a household) and the
standard deduction (the fixed deduction taken by taxpayers who do not submit a
list of itemized deductions). The EITC and child tax credits have dramatically
changed the income tax. Most low-income workers and many moderate-income
families now file income tax returns only to claim refunds. In 2005, for example, a
Figure 1
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married couple with two children owed no income tax until their income reached
$41,000. In 2004, the poverty threshold for a family of four was $19,157, about half
the level at which income tax now applies (Esenwein, 2005). To illustrate the same
point in another way, in 1987, 18.5 percent of the 103 million returns filed were
nontaxable. In 2003, 23.3 percent of the 130.4 million returns filed were nontax-
able (Parisi and Hollenbeck, 2005).
The transformation of the Internal Revenue Service from being solely a tax
collector to also being a check writer has produced difficulties. In 2003, more than
two-thirds of returns claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit were prepared by
paid preparers, many of whom tempt their customers with expensive “refund-antici-
pation” loans. The National Taxpayer Advocate has singled out the EITC as the
most troublesome complex provision of the tax code. Her call for major simplifi-
cation was seconded by the President’s Panel on Tax Reform (2005). In an effort
to combat erroneous EITC claims, the IRS shifted audit resources away from
high-income taxpayers to low-income families, provoking much criticism.1
Targeted Tax Breaks
Moving up the income scale, “targeted tax cuts”—that is, income tax reduc-
tions generally made available only to taxpayers with no more than a specified level
of income—have reduced tax burdens while greatly increasing complexity. Each
year’s federal budget is required to contain a list of “tax expenditures,” defined as
all tax credits, deductions, or exclusions that deviate from a “normal” income tax.
The largest tax expenditures are the employer payments for health insurance and
retirement savings that are excluded from taxation, along with the provisions that
allow payments for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and local
taxes to be deducted from taxable income. But the number of tax expenditures has
multiplied in recent years. The president’s budget for fiscal year 2006 listed 146
total tax expenditures, of which 66—or 45 percent of the total—have been added
since 1986. The estimated total costs of tax expenditures for individual income
taxes declined from about $500 billion in 1986 to about $360 billion in 1988,
following the 1986 tax reform, then rose to about $685 billion in 2002 (all in 2004
dollars).
Historically, when competing policy ideas aimed at a common goal emerged in
Congress, the leaders of the tax writing committees would fashion a compromise
provision with the advice of the Department of the Treasury and the Chief of Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Now, with the dispersion of power within the
Congress and the proliferation and expansion of tax staffs, Congress often com-
promises by enacting all of the ideas, leaving unsophisticated taxpayers bewildered
about how to cope. For a vivid illustration, consider incentives for paying for higher
1 Also, the Earned Income Tax Credit imposes a large “marriage penalty” on low-income families.
Imagine two low-income workers, with one or both eligible for the EITC. When they marry, their joint
income becomes high enough that their EITC benefits after marriage are either much lower or
nonexistent.
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education. There are eight tax expenditures for current-year education expenses:
two tax credits, three deductions, and three exclusions from income. Five other
provisions promote savings for college expenses. In 1987, there were only three
provisions encouraging college expenditures or savings. The 1997 Act alone added
five provisions that were estimated to cost $41 billion over five years, which together
represent the largest increase in federal funding for higher education since the GI
Bill (Jackson, 2006).
Comprehending the tax savings provided by these provisions, their various
eligibility requirements, how they interact, and their recordkeeping and reporting
requirements is mind-boggling. For example, the so-called HOPE credit provides a
100 percent nonrefundable tax credit for the first $1,000 of post-secondary tuition
and a 50 percent credit for the second $1,000 of tuition and related expenses for
the first two years of a student’s undergraduate education. The Lifetime Learning
credit provides a 20 percent credit for the first $10,000 of a family’s post-secondary
education, including all undergraduate, graduate, and professional education.
Both credits are reduced as income exceeds $40,000 ($80,000 for a married
couple) and disappear for taxpayers with more than $50,000 of income ($100,000
for a married couple). Only one of these credits is available per year for the same
student. Other overlapping provisions—which include limited deductions for tu-
ition; savings incentives such as education Individual Retirement Accounts and
qualified state tuition programs; exclusions from income for amounts used to pay
for educational expenses (for example, interest on education savings bonds); and
deductions for the costs of borrowing to pay for educational expenses—have
different income limits.
Each of the provisions has its own eligibility criteria and definition of qualified
expenses. For example, these rules do not provide consistent treatment with regard
to room and board; books, supplies, and equipment; sports expenses; nonacademic
fees; or the class of relatives whose expenses may be taken into account. A student
convicted of a felony for possession or distribution of a controlled substance is not
eligible for the HOPE credit, but such a conviction is no bar to the Lifetime
Learning credit. If amounts distributed from an education IRA are excludable from
income because they are used to pay the qualified higher education expenses of the
beneficiary, neither the HOPE nor Lifetime Learning credit may be claimed for the
same year with respect to the same individual. The individual may elect to forego
the exclusion, in which case a HOPE or Lifetime learning credit may be claimed.
The issues named here are just the tip of the iceberg.
Many people believe that tax incentives are enacted to reward campaign
contributors or to satisfy lobbyists, and sometimes they are, but many of the
complex provisions that now fill the tax code reflect congressional efforts to cater
to the general public. Congressional Republicans will embrace almost any tax cut,
and Democrats often view income tax benefits as the best way to achieve domestic
policy goals otherwise blocked by political barriers or legal limitations on additional
spending.
But relying on income tax breaks to rectify the nation’s social and economic
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problems often does not work especially well. The stream of tax breaks for educa-
tion has not addressed the problems of cost control or access to colleges and
universities. Financing America’s health care system for working Americans pri-
marily through a tax advantage for employers and employees, and more recently by
adding tax breaks for health care savings accounts coupled with high-deductible
health insurance, has left America with by far the highest health care costs in the
world and more than 40 million Americans without insurance. Nevertheless, Con-
gress and presidents, regardless of their political party, use income tax incentives
the way my mother employed chicken soup—as a magic elixir for every conceivable
ill. If the nation has a problem in access to education, child care affordability,
health insurance coverage, retirement security, or the financing of long-term care,
to name just a few, Congress hands out some income tax deductions or credits. The
competition to give tax breaks for various expenditures has broken the income tax.
Adding together both the money spent directly on tax preparers and the time spent
preparing tax information, ordinary citizens and businesses incurred compliance
costs of $265 billion last year—22 cents for every dollar collected—to fulfill their tax
obligations or to try to take advantage of provisions to reduce their income tax
(Hodge et al., 2005).
The Alternative Minimum Tax
In the wake of the tax rate reductions of the 2001 Act, problems due to the
alternative minimum tax (AMT) have taken center stage. Since 1969, the tax law
has contained provisions intended to assure that all high-income taxpayers would
pay at least a moderate amount of income tax. Since 1982, the minimum tax has
taken the form of an alternative tax schedule with a broader tax base and lower
rates than the regular tax: taxpayers are required to pay either the taxes they owe
under the regular tax code or under the alternative minimum tax, whichever is
higher. But over the last two decades, the regular and alternative tax codes have
evolved so that a greater share of taxpayers find themselves needing to pay the
alternative minimum tax.
Two key parameters in determining how many people will face greater tax
liabilities under the alternative minimum tax are the level of income that is exempt
under the alternative minimum tax and the tax rate applied above that level. In
1985, regular tax brackets and exemption amounts in the regular tax code began
to be indexed for inflation, but the basic $40,000 exemption in the alternative
minimum tax has never been indexed, so its real value has declined over time.
Then, the alternative minimum tax rate was 40 percent of the top marginal rate in
the regular income tax. The 1986 Act lowered the regular tax rate and raised the
alternative minimum tax rate from 20 to 21 percent, so that the alternative
minimum tax rate became 75 percent of the top marginal tax rate. The 1990 Act
increased the alternative minimum tax rates rate to 24 percent; the 1993 Act
increased the exemption to $45,000 and raised the alternative minimum tax rate
again, adding a second bracket so it had two rates of 26 and 28 percent. When
regular tax rates were reduced in 2001, alternative minimum tax rates were not
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changed. As a result, the top alternative minimum tax rate is now 80 percent of the
top individual rate. The 2001 Act increased the alternative minimum tax exemption
to $49,000 and the 2003 Act increased it to $58,000. But these increases were all
enacted on a temporary basis. And the alternative minimum tax also disallows a
number of commonplace tax deductions, such as for personal exemptions for
children and for state and local taxes.
Under current law, a larger share of taxpayers will become subject to the
alternative minimum tax in the years ahead. In 2002, 1.4 percent of tax returns
were subject to the alternative minimum tax; by 2010, 20 percent of all returns will
be subject to the alternative minimum tax, and revenues collected through the
alternative minimum tax will exceed those collected through the regular tax (Joint
Committee on Taxation, 2005; Burman et al., 2003). The alternative minimum tax
is burdensome to taxpayers as it requires them to calculate their taxes under two
sets of rules and then pay whichever result is higher. Members of Congress, the staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and President Bush’s 2005 Tax Reform Panel
all have called for repeal of the alternative minimum tax; however, repeal is
expensive. The President’s Panel (2005), for example, estimated that repeal of the
alternative minimum tax would cost $1.2 trillion over a ten-year period if the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent. If the alternative minimum tax expands its
reach dramatically, as current law provides, the resulting public anger might
stimulate major overhaul of the nation’s tax system.
Top Rates and Capital Gains Rates
At the top end of the income distribution, the most significant legislative
changes have involved revisions to the structure of tax rates and the taxation of
capital gains and dividends. Recent decades have also seen a significant shift in the
distribution of income toward the very top, which has affected the share of taxes
paid by this group.
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the top marginal income tax rate
was 70 percent with a 50 percent maximum rate on “earned income,” which is how
the tax code generally refers to wage and salary income. His 1981 legislation
dropped the top rate to 50 percent, and the 1986 Act further reduced it to
28 percent (although it also included a “bubble” rate of 33 percent that applied
below the top income level, constructed so that the highest average tax rate never
exceeded 28 percent). The first President Bush in 1990 agreed to eliminate this
bubble and raise the top rate to 31 percent. In 1993 President Clinton raised the
top rate to 39.6 percent. The 2001 act reversed field, phasing in a reduction in the
top rate to 35 percent and eliminating two provisions enacted in 1990 (a phase-out
at higher income levels of personal exemptions and a reduction of itemized
deductions) that had surreptitiously increased the top rate beyond the statutory
maximum. The highest and lowest statutory income tax rates over time are shown
in Figure 2.
This reduction in top marginal tax rates has been accompanied by a greater
share of income being concentrated at the top of the income distribution. In the
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period between 1979 and 2002, the share of income received by the highest quintile
rose substantially, while the shares of income of the four lowest quintiles declined.
Most of the increase for the top quintile occurred at the very top of the income
distribution. For example, the income share of the top 1 percent of the income
distribution rose steadily from a low of 9.6 percent in 1979 to a high of 21.6 percent
in 2000 before falling back to 16.9 percent in 2002. Indeed, the income share of the
top 0.1 percent grew from 3.3 percent to 10.5 percent during this period. The
amount of income needed to join this group more than quadrupled in nominal
dollars from $234,000 in 1979 to $1,278,000 in 2002, and doubled in real dollars
from $321,679 to $710,661 in constant 1982–1984 dollars (Strudler et al., 2004).
Capital gains, which are gains on an asset held over a period of time, always
present a difficult question for the tax code. One theoretical answer is to tax capital
gains as they accrue, even if the asset has not been sold, but this approach has long
been a political dead letter. But otherwise, taxpayers will have some discretion
about when to sell the asset and thus when to pay taxes. Advocates of lowering the
capital gains rate claim that it will stimulate new investments, advance technology,
trigger economic growth, and enhance democracy and freedom. With similar
hyperbole, opponents of lower capital gains rates claim that taxing capital gains the
same as ordinary income would eliminate tax shelters, dramatically simplify the law,
and promote tax justice. Both sides’ claims are overstated. Those with great wealth
have always enjoyed great discretion about when to realize capital gains. Opportu-
nities for high-income taxpayers to defer and avoid capital-gains taxes make high
rates of tax unproductive. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the revenue
lost by taxing capital gains at 15 percent rather than 20 or 25 percent is compen-
sated for by increased savings, investment, or economic growth.
Since 1921, capital gains had been taxed at a rate substantially lower than that
on either earned income or other investment income. For example, during the
Figure 2
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period 1942–1969, capital gains were taxed at a top rate of 25 percent while the
highest rate on other income ranged as high as 91 percent. In the years immedi-
ately preceding the 1986 Act, the capital gains rate was 20 percent. The 1986 Act
raised the capital gains rate to 28 percent, the same rate as for other income, which
unleashed a torrent of gains realizations in late 1986—$45.4 billion in December
alone (Burman et al., 1994)—to take advantage of the 20 percent rate before the
new rate took effect in January 1987. When George H. W. Bush assumed the
presidency in 1989, he advocated lowering the capital gains rate to 15 percent, but
the Democratic Congress thwarted him. However, the 1997 tax legislation signed by
Bill Clinton reduced the capital gains rate to 20 percent. In 2003 Congress further
lowered the capital gains rate to 15 percent.
Revenue and Distributional Tables
Revenue effects of tax legislation used to be estimated over a five-year “budget
window”; that period is still sometimes five years but more often is ten years.
Unsurprisingly, a fixed period has stimulated tricks and dodges to push revenue
losses outside the “budget window.” One straightforward example is Congress’s
shift from standard individual retirement accounts (IRAs), where contributions to
the account are deductible from taxes when contributed and taxed when with-
drawn, to so-called Roth IRAs, where no deduction is allowed for contributions but
withdrawals are tax-free. Although these two types of IRA’s have similar present-
value revenue effects, the Roth-type IRA postpones revenue costs until people retire
and therefore appears much less expensive within a five or ten-year budget window.
Other examples abound (Graetz, 1995).
In the 2001 and 2003 tax acts, revenue-estimating games reached new lows.
Congress agreed to “limit” the overall size of the tax cuts to $1.2 trillion in the 2001
Act and to $350 billion in 2003 over their respective ten-year budget windows.
However, Congress then enacted a host of tax cuts that would take effect in a few
years and then terminate, which reduced their cost in the ten-year window. The
entire 2001 tax act, for example, sunsets at the end of 2010—so it has no official
budgetary costs after that date. After the laws were enacted, with George Bush
taking the lead, Republicans immediately started working to accelerate many of the
cuts and repeal the sunsets. The original budgetary limits set in 2001 and 2003 fell
by the wayside. When proponents of repealing the termination provisions enacted
in 2001 and 2003 say that they want to make the tax cuts “permanent” they mean
they want to eliminate the sunsets scheduled to take effect. In tax policy, the law is
never really permanent; the fat lady never sings.
This stop-and-start tax law created new difficulties for the public. How, for
example, can one sensibly do estate-tax planning when the laws that govern the
estate tax increase tax exemptions and reduce rates between 2001 and 2009, repeal
the estate tax for 2010, and reinstate the pre-2001 rates and exemptions in 2011?
Estimates of the proposed changes on the distribution of tax burdens have also
played a major role in shaping the tax legislation of the past two decades. They
were, for example, at the forefront of the 1990 budget negotiations (Graetz, 1995;
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1999). Similarly, President Bush’s 2001 Act cut tax rates at both at the top and
bottom of the income scale and child credits were increased significantly, so that
taxes were reduced to some extent across the income distribution.
The changes in the taxing and distribution of income since 1986 have dra-
matically altered the structure of the income tax and its distribution of burdens.
Figure 3 shows the share of income tax liability by quintile from 1986 to 2002.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the federal income tax burden in 2006. In the
bottom two quintiles of the income distribution, the overall income tax is negative,
because of the refundable earned income tax credit and child credits. For low-
income taxpayers—indeed, for the four bottom quintiles—the payroll taxes that
support Social Security and Medicare, but are not shown in the tables, are more
burdensome than the income tax.
The income tax remains quite progressive, with about two-thirds of income tax
now being paid by the top 10 percent of earners. However, it is difficult to
determine in an airtight way whether the progressivity of the tax code has risen or
fallen over time.2 To be sure, the share of taxes paid by the highest-income group
has risen. But the share of income received by that group has also risen quite
substantially, which would raise their share of taxes even with no change in the tax
2 Thomas Picketty and Emmanuel Saez (in this issue) claim that progressivity has declined dramatically
since the 1960s.
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code at all. For example, the top 10 percent income group paid 55 percent of the
total individual income tax in 1987 and 45.6 percent in 1988, while earning
between 35 and 39 percent of all adjusted gross income in those years. In 2002, the
top 10 percent (with adjusted grosss income of at least $92,663) earned
41.8 percent of adjusted gross income and paid 65.7 percent of the total individual
income tax. Taxes paid by high-income taxpayers often vary considerably because
there are better and worse times to realize capital gains, depending on changes in
asset markets and the timing of changes in the tax code. Also, the tax cuts since
2001 have helped to generate large budget deficits. A full model for determining
the progressivity of the tax code would need to take into account the distributional
effects of how those budget deficits will be repaid over time. Nevertheless, the
income tax remains quite progressive, with about two-thirds of its revenue coming
from the highest 10 percent of earners.
The Corporate Income Tax
The 1986 Tax Reform Act managed to achieve a 28 percent top marginal rate
for individuals and meet its goals of revenue and distributional neutrality by
increasing the tax burden on corporations by $120 billion in the years 1987
through 1991 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1987). This outcome was politically
possible because corporate interests split between capital-intensive companies that
wanted favorable depreciation allowances, which would allow them to write off
their large capital expenses quickly, and service companies more interested in
lower corporate tax rates. The 1986 Act reversed the trend, spurred by the 1981 tax
Figure 4
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cuts, of declining corporate taxes both as a share of federal revenues and of GDP
(shown earlier in Figure 1). However, corporate income taxes, which are now about
2 percent of GDP, are not likely ever again to reach the levels of 4 to 5 percent of
GDP that prevailed in the 1950s and even into the 1960s.
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, three important phenomena affecting the
corporate income tax have been the rise of corporate tax shelters, the growing
interest in the integration of corporate and individual income taxes, and the
internationalization of the economy. I consider these three issues in turn.
Corporate Tax Shelters
The 1986 Tax Reform Act halted the proliferation of individual tax shelters by
enacting limitations on deductions of “passive losses.” Specifically, these rules
prohibited individuals from using “tax shelters”—investments in which they had no
active managerial involvement but that were structured to create substantial losses
on paper—to offset their income from earnings or investments. However, no
similar solution has emerged to slow corporate tax shelters. In recent years, corporate
tax shelters have reduced federal revenues by many billions of dollars and have
undermined the public’s sense of tax fairness.
The corporate tax shelter phenomenon dates from at least the early 1980s,
when Congress rewarded corporate tax planning by enacting “safe-harbor leasing,”
a scheme that allowed corporations to sell their tax savings that were unusable
because the firm’s tax bill had already been reduced to zero (such as from losses,
depreciation of their capital investments, or foreign tax credits) to companies that
could use them. The straightforward way to allow companies to capture the value
of tax breaks they could not use would have been to refund taxes, but this would
have smacked of “corporate welfare.” Congress preferred instead to permit com-
panies to sell tax benefits amongst themselves. This “lease-a-deduction” scheme
became an object of popular satire; for example, Dianne Bennett, a tax lawyer from
Buffalo, New York, suggested that low- and moderate-income families should be
able to “lease” a welfare family to obtain their children’s tax allowances (Clark,
1991). Only one’s imagination limits the possibilities for “leasing” tax breaks.
By 1986, when Congress eliminated safe-harbor leasing, corporate attitudes
toward the income tax had changed. Many managers had come to regard their tax
departments as another potential profit center. Corporations could increase share-
holders’ returns by producing a better product, selling more goods or services,
cutting costs, or reducing taxes. Tax savings were often the easiest.
A decade later, the character of corporate tax shelters had changed. Rather
than transferring legitimate tax deductions to a corporation that could use them,
corporate tax shelters frequently have no nontax economic substance at all. One
common technique is to create a financial transaction with offsetting gains and
losses, and have the losses allocated to a U.S. corporation while the gains are
allocated to a taxpayer not subject to U.S. income taxation. Often, these “tax
indifferent” parties are foreign financial institutions.
Most efforts to address the corporate tax shelter problem have involved greater
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disclosures of tax-shelter transactions and greater penalties on those who enter into
them. It is easy to define a tax shelter in general terms: tax shelters are deals done
by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid. But
translating this definition into legislative language to attack tax shelters or to justify
enhanced penalties is far more difficult. To be effective, any attack on corporate tax
shelters must change the incentives for corporate management to enter into such
transactions. Many companies are willing to take the chance that tax shelter
transactions either will not be discovered by the IRS or, if discovered, that a court
will uphold the taxpayer’s view of the facts and the law. No natural counterforce
exists to offset the potential benefits a company might win by playing what is,
effectively, a tax audit lottery.
In fact, as Desai (2005) recently explained in this journal, companies keep two
different sets of books, one for tax purposes and one for reporting to shareholders.
Thus, corporate tax-shelter deductions, credits, and losses reduce tax liability
without also reducing the income reported on the company’s financial statements
to shareholders. In this way, tax shelters give a company the best of both worlds:
lower taxes are paid to the government while higher profits are reported to
shareholders. In the 1986 Act, Congress linked the two different corporate income
statements, one for shareholders and one for taxes, in a corporate alternative
minimum tax, but this linkage expired after three years. The IRS recently expanded
its required disclosures of these disparities, but a stable solution to the corporate
tax-shelter problem may well require greater conformity between book and tax
accounting for publicly traded companies.
Integration of the Corporate and Individual Taxes
Integration of corporate and individual income taxes—so that corporate in-
come would be taxed only once at either the corporate or shareholder level, rather
than both when earned by the corporation and again when distributed as a
dividend—has recently attracted significant attention. Important studies were pro-
duced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) and the American Law
Institute (Warren, 1993; Graetz and Warren, 1998). One major option is to provide
shareholders with a credit for any corporate taxes paid on dividends received. In
this approach, corporate income is ultimately taxed only once at the shareholder’s
tax rate. The other major policy option for integrating corporate and shareholder
taxes is full or partial shareholder dividend exclusion—that is, profits paid out as
dividends are taxed at the corporate level, but would be excluded from taxation at
the shareholder level.3 Until quite recently, many European countries limited
double taxation of corporate income by providing full or partial shareholder
credits for corporate taxes paid with respect to income distributed as a dividend.
But after a series of decisions by the European Court of Justice holding that
3 A third option, deduction of dividends, is usually rejected because it would automatically extend the
benefits of corporate and individual income tax integration to foreign shareholders and exempt
shareholders.
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shareholder credit systems violate the free movement of capital guaranteed by the
European Treaties, many European nations have replaced their shareholder credit
systems with partial shareholder exclusions of dividends (Vann, 2003).
In 2003, President Bush urged Congress to exclude from shareholders’ income
dividends paid out of corporate income that already had been subject to U.S.
corporate level tax—a proposal modeled after a 1992 U.S. Treasury report. Con-
gress instead provided a 15 percent rate for dividends regardless of whether the
income had been previously taxed at the corporate level. At the same time, also in
the name of reducing the double taxation of corporate income, Congress reduced
the capital gains rate to 15 percent, but without regard to whether the gains are
attributable to retained earnings taxed at the corporate level. The current state of
affairs does not seem stable. Many Democrats have since urged a return to higher
rates on both dividends and capital gains. Others, including the President’s Tax
Reform Panel (2005), have urged complete elimination of double taxes, at least for
dividends paid by U.S. companies.
Internationalization
Flows of direct and portfolio investments into and out of the United States
have increased dramatically since 1986. In 1986, foreign-owned assets in the U.S.
economy totaled $1.5 trillion (measured at market value), while U.S.-owned assets
abroad were $1.6 trillion. By 2004, foreign-owned assets in the U.S. economy
climbed to $12.5 trillion, while U.S.-owned assets abroad had reached $10.0 trillion
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/home/iip.htm,
accessed May 12, 2006). Foreign financial and global trading centers offering
favorable tax treatment are now commonplace. These developments, along with a
range of new financial instruments and technologies, pose striking challenges for
corporate income taxation. The United States, like other countries, has long
wanted to avoid situations in which corporate income earned abroad is taxed both
by a foreign country and by the U.S. government, but the United States also doesn’t
want American firms to shift income to related foreign companies to reduce taxes
on their income earned in the United States.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress was primarily concerned with limiting
benefits for income earned abroad. The legislation, for example, classified foreign
income into nine separate baskets for determining eligibility for foreign tax credits,
thereby restricting the ability of companies to offset U.S. taxes with foreign taxes on
unrelated income. The 1986 Act also limited interest deductions for companies
that invest abroad.
It is common for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies to overpay their
foreign parents for intangible assets, shifting income abroad. This outcome also
occurs when U.S. companies shift income to low-taxed foreign subsidiaries. During
the 1990s, in an effort to curtail such practices, the U.S. Treasury substantially
revised its transfer-pricing regulations and the IRS initiated advance pricing agree-
ments with companies and other nations.
Many OECD nations have responded to the increasing internationalization of
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business by reducing their corporate tax rates and broadening their corporate tax
bases (CBO, 2005; Sullivan, 2006). After the 1986 Act, the U.S. corporate tax rate
was one of the lowest among the OECD nations. Now, as shown in Figure 5, it is one
of the highest.4
The internationalization of business has effectively capped the role of corpo-
rate income taxes as a source of federal revenue. Very little U.S. tax revenue is now
being collected from foreign-source business income.5 The thrust of the 1986
legislation—toward tightening income-tax rules for foreign investments by U.S.
companies—has been reversed. Nations today want low corporate income taxes
both to attract domestic investments and to reduce the temptation for domestic
companies to shift income abroad. Although President Clinton in 1993 got a
4 Figure 5 does not include subnational taxes; including these would increase the rates of the United
States and a few other countries, notably Canada, Germany, and Japan.
5 Both the Joint Committee on Taxation and the President’s Tax Reform Panel (2005) have urged
replacing the U.S. foreign tax credit with an exemption for dividends paid out of foreign source business
income. Depending on how royalties and certain business deductions are treated, such a change might
increase U. S. corporate revenues, a fact that demonstrates how little tax revenue is being collected from
foreign-source income. I have elsewhere urged an exemption for dividends paid from foreign-source
active business income (Graetz, 2001).
Figure 5
Top Corporate Tax Rates in the OECD, 2005
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one-percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate (from 34 to 35 percent)
through Congress, it now seems far more likely that U.S. corporate rates will
decrease in the years ahead. The 2004 Act substantially liberalized both the foreign
tax credit and interest deduction limitations enacted in 1986. In 2004, Congress
also created a special lower corporate tax rate for income from domestic manufac-
turing activities, thus reducing the tax savings from taking manufacturing abroad.
Increasing taxes on corporations may be as popular with the public now as in
1986, but it is far less feasible economically. There is a need for a fundamental
reexamination of U.S. international income tax policies. Otherwise, the combina-
tion of sophisticated corporate tax planning and tax competition among nations to
attract investments may cause the taxation of international corporate income to
unravel completely.
A Look Ahead
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has not proved a stable outcome: Congress has
since narrowed the tax base and raised income tax rates. Internationalization of the
economy raises the question of whether corporate income taxes can be relied upon
as a stable source of revenues. Moreover, the tax system is also under continual
reexamination because federal deficits of $300–$400 billion a year are now com-
monplace and, in the coming decades, an aging population and rising health care
costs will put great additional pressures on the budgets of both federal and state
governments. The challenge of tax reform is to create and maintain a tax system
that produces adequate revenues in a simpler, fairer, and more economically
efficient manner.
The complexities, inequities, and inefficiencies of the current income tax have
led many analysts and more than a few politicians to call for replacing all or a
substantial part of the income tax with some form of consumption tax. Consider-
able disagreement, however, exists over the best structure and role for a consump-
tion tax. The alternative with the most cosponsors in Congress is a national sales
tax. But to replace the revenue of the income tax, a national sales tax would need
to have a rate in the range of 30 percent (Boortz and Linder, 2005; Slemrod, 2005),
depending on which goods and services are exempt from the sales tax. This rate
would be much higher than any sales tax in the world and would create strong
incentives for evasion. The main alternative to the income tax recommended by the
President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (2005) is the so-called Growth and
Investment Tax; which is a cousin of the “flat tax” proposed by Hall and Rabushka
(1995) and also similar to the “X” tax proposed by Bradford (2005). These taxes are
consumption taxes, variations on more common types of value-added taxes (VAT).
However, unlike the common VAT, they tax wages and salary (but not the return
on investments) at the individual level, and they can include personal exemptions
or progressive tax rates as desired. The Growth and Investment Tax would tax
wages at progressive rates up to 30 percent and all dividends, capital gains, and
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interest income at 15 percent. This tax would deny deductions for interest paid;
allow businesses to treat all money spent on capital investments as an immediate
expense (rather than depreciating it over time); and exclude the financial income
of “nonfinancial” corporations from tax. “Financial institutions” would be taxed on
a cash-flow basis. The President’s Panel (2005) describes this tax as equivalent to a
30 percent credit-method value-added tax (a rate higher than in Europe or the rest
of the OECD) coupled with a progressive system of wage subsidies and a separate
single-rate tax on capital income.
The proposed Growth and Investment Tax represents some compromises
made with an eye to political realities. For example, I agree with the panel’s
judgment that taxing people only on wages will not fly politically. But even so, a tax
reform along these lines is not a practical alternative. First, many U.S. businesses
will not relish giving up their interest deductions in exchange for immediate
expensing of investments and exclusion of financial income from taxation. Second,
as the panel recognized, special rules are needed for financial institutions, raising
line-drawing difficulties that may prove insuperable in an economy where banks are
no longer completely walled off from other firms. Third, when the panel tacked a
15 percent tax on individual income from investments onto a consumption tax, it
created significant incentives to shift investment income to a business, and of-
fended consumption tax advocates. Fourth, the panel used a gimmick—shifting
regular IRAs and other retirement savings into Roth-type IRAs—to push costs
outside the budget window, so that the “revenue neutral” rate for the Growth and
Investment Tax could be held to 30 percent. Finally, and most importantly, the
panel admits that the Growth and Investment Tax violates both the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and all 86 of America’s existing bilateral
income tax treaties.
As its principal alternative to the Growth and Investment Tax, the President’s
Panel recommended a 1986-style reform of the income tax. The main benefit of that
plan would be the repeal of the alternative minimum tax; other benefits, like reducing
the top-rate individual income tax rate by two percentage points to 33 percent are
comparatively minor. To pay for these changes, the Panel found it necessary to attack
a number of political sacred cows, such as the deductions for mortgage interest and for
state and local taxes. Ultimately, the proposal is politically unviable: it trades immediate
and painful base broadening for only trivial rate reductions and the avoidance of a
future pain—the alternative minimum tax. The impact of the alternative minimum tax
will not be felt by most people for several years.
Whatever the merits of the 1986 Tax Reform Act when it was enacted, it is
neither practical nor desirable to reattempt to fix the income tax through a tradeoff
involving base-broadening and rate reductions. The fundamental problem is that in
a global economy, the United States can no longer afford to rely so heavily on
income taxation to finance federal expenditures.
It is puzzling that U.S. economists and policymakers have struggled to fashion
novel consumption tax alternatives, like a national sales tax or the Growth and
Investment Tax, when there is a well-functioning consumption tax—the value-
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added tax—being used throughout the OECD and in nearly 150 countries world-
wide. The value-added tax works by collecting a tax on value-added at each stage of
production. At each stage of production, firms can subtract the value-added tax that
they paid to their suppliers from the value-added tax they must collect when they
sell their goods and services. Since the value-added tax is collected from firms
whose records can be used to check each other, it has proven to be an effective and
relatively efficient method for collecting taxes throughout the world.
It is quite practical to create a combination of a value-added tax and an income
tax that is roughly as progressive as current law and also revenue neutral, as in
Graetz (1999) and (2002). This plan would return the income tax to its pre–World
War II status—a much simpler low-rate tax on a relatively thin slice of higher-
income Americans—and replace the lost revenue with a value-added tax. For
example, a value-added tax in the range of 10 to 14 percent would finance an
income tax system where no family pays any tax on its first $100,000 in earned
income, with a marginal rate of no more than 25 percent to be applied to individual
incomes over $100,000. A 15 to 20 percent income tax would apply to corporations.
Of course, if the tax base was broadened along the lines proposed by the President’s
Panel (2005), then these tax rates could be even lower. A revised version of the
Earned Income Tax Credit could be used to protect low- and moderate-income
families from any tax increase. If payroll withholding was appropriately adjusted,
this system could allow the elimination of low- and middle-income tax returns,
freeing about 150 million people from filing income tax returns. For most Amer-
icans, April 15 would then be just another day.
Using a value-added tax to replace much of the income tax has many advan-
tages. A combined value-added tax and income tax system would make the United
States quite similar to the average OECD country in terms of consumption taxes
relative to GDP as well as tax rates on consumption. The U.S. income tax, however,
would be much smaller than what people generally face abroad. In 2002, the U.S.
individual and corporate income taxes were about 12 percent of GDP, compared to
an OECD average of about 13 percent and a European average of about 14 percent
for income taxes. My plan in which a value-added tax replaces much of the income
tax would reduce the U.S. income tax to just over 4 percent of GDP.
This tax system would be far more encouraging to savings and economic
growth. Most Americans would owe no tax on their savings, and every American
would face lower taxes on savings and investment. The United States would be a
more attractive place for corporate investments. Moreover, this plan avoids the
difficult issues of making a transition to an untried tax system, like the Growth and
Investment Tax. It fits well within existing international tax and trade agreements.
A dramatic reform like a mixture of value-added tax and income tax could redeem
the failed promise of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
y The author would like to thank Nicholas Caton for research assistance and the editors of
this journal for many helpful comments.
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